Groundswell

Det er længe siden jeg har set en så interessant bog med så håbløs en titel: Groundswell. Hvem i alverden vil købe en bog med det navn? Og så til 460 kr. Den er skrevet af to folk fra Forrester Research, og er udgivet på Børsens Forlag.

Men bogen er ikke uinteressant. Under-overskriften med meget små typer antyder det: “Vinderstrategier i en verden af sociale teknologier“. Forfatterne præsenterer først hvad understrømmen er, nemlig den mangfoldighed af sociale medier der vælter ind over os i disse år: facebook, youtube, flickr, wikipedia, twitter og mange flere. Hovedpointen er at understrømmen enten kan modarbejde os eller vi kan vende den til vores fordel og den analyse er jeg enig i.

Forfatterne præsenterer en seks-trins rangstige (fra inaktive til skabere) for hvor aktivt mennesker bruger nettet. Jeg tror jeg hører til på øverste trin: jeg har en blog og hjemmside, jeg uploader fotos og videoer og meget andet. Det er en god systematik og den bruger forfatterne til at sammenligne kunder med. Mon ikke Apple kunder er ret forskellige fra Dell kunder?

Hovedparten af bogen handler om hvordan en virksomhed kan udnytte understrømmen til sin fordel. Lytte til den, tale med den, aktivere den og inddrage den. Altsammen godt, men det vigtigste er nok hvordan understrømmen forvandler virksomheden, forhåbentlig til at blive mere orienteret mod sine kunder. Og så glemmer forfatterne ikke at virksomheden har sin egen understrøm, som ledelsen også skal interessere sig for.

Spændende emner og kvalificerede forfattere. Så på trods af en intetsigende titel og et kedeligt omslag anbefaler jeg gerne bogen.

8 kommentarer til “Groundswell”

  1. Stephan E

    Hej Lars.

    I princippet helt enig. Men bemærk at man ikke addresserer den pointe at man kun lytter for at profilere hvorefter man vender rundt og begynder at forfalde til secondguessing baseret på dataanalyse.

    Det er døden for innovation i markedsprocesserne fordi fokus bliver på at kommunikere ved at skabe misperception som overvægter fordele med stadigt mere emotionelle argumenter.

    Et godt eksempel er at hvis et medicinalselskab eller politisk parti får gang i en sådan kommunikationsmæssig maskinkanon vil de skabe overmedicinering via hypokondi eller styrke den destruktive tendens til opflammende følelsesdemokrati.

    Pointen er ikke at man skal forbyde medicinalaselsakber at markedsføre eller politiske partier i at agitere, men at man i fællesskab skal sikre borgeren mod den umynddiggørende profilering der gør den personlige meningsdannelse til et alt for let bytte for dygtige retorikere.

    Man skal TVINGE markedskommunikation op i det rationelle bevidste lag ved flytte kontrollen til modtageren.

    Problemet er at Sociale Netværk som den nye stærkt overvurdere hype uden respekt for de endnu stærkere destruktive konsekvenser er i færd med at gøre det stik modsatte – at gøre BORGEREN transparant for alle misbruger uden nogen former for modvirkende foranstaltninger.

    F.eks. er det samfundsmæssigt destruktivt at man starter med via fejldesign af infrastrukturen at forære selskaber som Google og Facebook Danmarks vigtigste aktiv – borgernes profil og efterspørgselspræferancer – HVOREFTER DANSKE VIRKSOMHEDER SKAL BETALE FORMUER FOR AT FÅ ADGANG TIL DEN SAMME INFORMATION SOM MAN LIGE HAR STJÅLET FRA BORGERNE (ved at fratage borgeren kontrollen).

    Jeg tvivler på at bogen tager ansvar – præcis som produktionsteknologien i 70erne ikke tog ansvar for miljøsvineriet tager Web 2.0 ikke socialt ansvar for de DESTRUKTIVE konsekvenser af dårligt design.

    Men man burde dog i en anbefaling huske at nævne at der er tale om digital forureningsteknologi uden nogen forståelse for bæredygtig udvikling.

  2. Josef Vissarionovitsj Dsjugasjvili

    @ Steffi

    Strange currencies ?

    The only thing rising faster than China is the hype about China.

    China’s economic boom has dazzled investors and captivated the world. But beyond the new high-rises and churning factories lie rampant corruption, rising social injustice and an elite preoccupied with its own survival.

    The People’s Republic of China’s gross domestic product exceeded that of Germany’s, making China the world’s third-largest economy. And China has replaced the United States as the world’s largest exporter of technology products. Many experts predict that the Chinese economy will be second only to the United States by 2020, and possibly surpass it by 2050.

    Western investors hail China’s strong economic fundamentals — a high savings rate, huge labor pool and powerful work ethic — and willingly gloss over its imperfections. Businesspeople talk about China’s being simultaneously the world’s greatest manufacturer and its greatest market. Private equity firms are scouring the Middle Kingdom for acquisitions. Chinese Internet companies are fetching dot-com-era prices on the Nasdaq. Some of the world’s leading financial institutions, including Bank of America, Citibank and HSBC, have bet billions on the country’s financial future by acquiring minority stakes in China’s state-controlled banks, many of them burdened by huge nonperforming loans. Not to be left out, every global automobile giant has built or is planning new facilities in China, despite a flooded market and plunging profit margins.

    And why shouldn’t they believe the hype?

    The record of China’s growth during the past two decades has proved pessimists wrong and optimists not optimistic enough. But before we all start learning Chinese and marveling at the accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party, we might want to pause. Upon close examination, China’s record loses some of its luster.

    China’s economic performance since 1979 is actually less impressive than that of its East Asian neighbors, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, during comparable periods of growth, especially if adjusted for the quality of growth. Its banking system, which costs Beijing about 30 percent of annual GDP in bailouts, is saddled with nonperforming loans (ones without an expectation of repayment that have not yet been written off) and is probably the most fragile in Asia.

    Behind the glowing headlines are fundamental frailties rooted in the Chinese neo-Leninist state. Unlike Maoism, neo-Leninism blends one-party rule and state control of key sectors of the economy with partial market reforms and an end to self-imposed isolation from the world economy. The Maoist state preached egalitarianism and relied on the loyalty of workers and peasants. The neo-Leninist state practices elitism, draws its support from technocrats, the military, and the police, and co-opts new social elites (professionals and private entrepreneurs) and foreign capital — all vilified under Maoism. Neo-Leninism has rendered the ruling Chinese Communist Party more resilient but has also generated self-destructive forces.

    To most Western observers, China’s economic success obscures the predatory characteristics of its neo-Leninist state. But Beijing’s brand of authoritarian politics is spawning a dangerous mix of crony capitalism, rampant corruption and widening inequality. Dreams that the country’s economic liberalization will someday lead to political reform remain distant.

    After a quarter century of gradual economic reform, has China succeeded in transforming its old command economy into a genuine market economy? Not nearly as well as most people would guess. Although China was one of the earliest socialist economies to begin serious reform, recent data on the country’s regulatory system, international trade, fiscal policy and legal structure place China in the bottom third of 127 countries surveyed for economic freedom, below most Eastern European countries, India and Mexico, and all of its East Asian neighbors, save Burma and Vietnam.

    To many observers, Beijing’s tight grip on the Chinese economy means only that its reform process is incomplete. As China continues to open itself, they predict, state control will ease and market forces will clear away inefficient industries and clean up state institutions. The strong belief in gradual but inexorable economic liberalization often has a political corollary: that market forces will eventually produce civil liberties and political pluralism.

    It’s a comforting thought. Yet these optimistic visions tend to ignore the neo-Leninist regime’s desperate need for unfettered access to economic spoils. Few authoritarian regimes can maintain power through coercion alone. Most mix coercion with patronage to secure support from key constituencies, such as the bureaucracy, the military and business interests. In other words, an authoritarian regime imperils its capacity for political control if it embraces full economic liberalization. Most authoritarian regimes know that much, and none better than Beijing.

    Today, Beijing oversees a vast patronage system that secures the loyalty of supporters and allocates privileges to favored groups. The party appoints 81 percent of the chief executives of state-owned enterprises and 56 percent of all senior corporate executives.

    State enterprises are miserably unprofitable. In 2003, a boom year, their median rate of return on assets was a measly 1.5 percent. More than 35 percent of state enterprises lose money and 1 in 6 has more debts than assets. China is the only country in history to have simultaneously achieved record economic growth and a record number of nonperforming bank loans.

    Political savvy and business acumen do not often go together. Because of the party’s fixation with high growth, government officials are rewarded for delivering, or appearing to deliver, precisely that. This incentive structure fuels a widespread misallocation of capital to “image projects” (such as new factories, luxury shopping malls, recreational facilities, and unnecessary infrastructure) that burnish local officials’ records and strengthen their chances of promotion. The results of these mistakes — gleaming office complexes, industrial parks, landscaped highways and public squares — tend to impress Western visitors, who view them as further proof of China’s economic prowess.

    The Chinese economy is not merely inefficient; it has also fallen victim to crony capitalism with Chinese characteristics — the marriage between unchecked power and ill-gotten wealth. And corruption is worst where the hand of the state is strongest. The most corrupt sectors in China, such as power generation, tobacco, banking, financial services, and infrastructure, are all state-controlled monopolies. None of that is unprecedented, of course. Tycoons in Russia, after all, have looted the state’s natural resources. China, at least, boasts genuine private entrepreneurs who have built prosperous companies. But China’s politically connected tycoons have cashed in on China’s real estate boom; nearly half of Forbes’ list of the 100 richest individuals in China in 2004 were real estate developers.

    Various indicators, pieced together from official sources, suggest endemic graft within the state. The number of “large-sum cases” (those involving monetary amounts greater than $6,000) nearly doubled between 1992 and 2002, indicating that more wealth is being looted by corrupt officials. The rot appears to be spreading up the ranks, as more and more senior officials have been ensnared. The number of officials at the county level and above prosecuted by the government rose from 1,386 in 1992 to 2,925 in 2002.

    An optimist might believe that these figures reveal stronger enforcement rather than metastasizing corruption, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Dishonest officials today face little risk of serious punishment. On average, 140,000 party officials and members were caught in corruption scandals each year in the 1990s, and 5.6 percent of these were criminally prosecuted. In 2004, 170,850 party officials and members were implicated, but only 4,915 (or 2.9 percent) were subject to criminal prosecution. So, party membership has its privileges.

    Rapid economic growth has not yet produced China’s much-anticipated political pluralism.

    In part, democracy itself has been a victim of the country’s economic expansion. However flawed and mismanaged, the country’s rapid growth has bolstered Beijing’s legitimacy and reduced pressure on its ruling elites to liberalize. Democratic transitions in developing countries are often caused by economic crises blamed on the incompetence and mismanagement of the ancien regime. China hasn’t experienced that crisis yet. Meanwhile, the riches available to the ruling class tend to drown any movement for democratic reform from within the elite. Political power has become more valuable because it can be converted into wealth and privilege unimaginable in the past. At the moment, China’s economic growth is having a perverse effect on democratization: It makes the ruling elite even more reluctant to part with power.

    Generous government spending on law and order helps to ensure that power-sharing won’t be necessary in the near future. Since the Tiananmen Square tragedy, the party has invested billions in beefing up the paramilitary police force (the People’s Armed Police) that has been deployed in suppressing internal unrest. To counter the threat posed by the information revolution, and especially the Internet, the Chinese government has blended technological savvy with regulatory might.

    The Chinese “Internet police,” officially known as the Ministry of Public Security’s Internet and Security Supervision Bureau, is reportedly more than 30,000 strong. Its Beijing branch proudly claimed that, in 2002, it participated in a multiagency exercise to see whether the government could rid the Internet of “harmful content” within 48 hours of the onset of an emergency. (During the exercise, all “harmful content” was removed in 19 hours.) The party’s refined strategy of “selective repression” singles out only those who openly challenge its authority while leaving the general public alone. China is one of the few authoritarian states where homosexuality and sex-change operations are permitted, but political dissent is not.

    The emerging social elite, by contrast, is co-opted and coddled. The party showers the urban intelligentsia, professionals and private entrepreneurs with economic perks, professional honors, and political access. For example, nationwide, 145,000 designated experts, or about 8 percent of senior professionals, received “special government stipends” (monthly salary supplements) in 2004; tens of thousands of former college professors have been recruited into the party and promoted to senior government positions. At least for now, the party’s charm campaign is working: The social groups that are usually the forces of democratization have been politically neutralized.

    China has already paid a heavy price for the flaws of its political system and the corruption it has spawned. Its new leaders, though aware of the depth of the decay, are taking only modest steps to correct it. For the moment, China’s strong economic fundamentals and the boundless energy of its people have concealed and offset its poor governance, but they will carry China only so far. Someday soon, we will know whether such a flawed system can pass a stress test: a severe economic shock, political upheaval, a public health crisis or an ecological catastrophe. China may be rising, but no one really knows whether it can fly.

    ”Everything under the heavens is in chaos, and the situation is excellent” Mao

  3. Stephan E

    @ Schmendrick

    Citatet er både relevant og interessant selvom det burde have den rigtige kilde uden editeringer og ikke mindst dateres til 2006 hvilket stiller det i en anden og langt skarpere kontekst FØR krisen som har ramt KINA hårdt.
    http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18110

    Når det er sagt ved jeg ikke helt hvad du vil med det.

    Ja, ethvert teknokratisk regime underminerer samfundet. Det gælder i Kina og det gælder i Danmark.

    Forskellen er blot at Kina kommer nedefra og udnytter at befolkningen vil slide for selv små forbedringer, mens Danmark er på vej ned fordi embedsmændenes magtmisbrug er kammet over i ren embedsmisbrug.

    Det ændrer ikke ved at markedet har løftet over 400 mio kinesere ud af absolut fattigdom og at markedet er forudsætningen for ethvert system for at det kan finansieres, men også at det ikke er tilstrækkeligt hvis systemet er et regime som blokerer og undertrykker.

    Det ændrer heller ikke ved at systemer som reelt er regimer køber de stærke i civilsamfundet ved at give dem “magt” = formel ret til at tygge befolkningens ben samtidig med at de opkræver skatter for kongen og holder befolkningen i ave. Det system går tilbage til år 1000 eller tidligere.

    Vore dages vasaller for centraladministrationen er gatekeeperen i infrastrukturen som udnyttes til systematiske overvågning – tele, bank, transport, shipping etc.

    Se f.eks. hvordan Finansministeriet og VTU systemetisk ignorerer lovginving og samfundets interesser når de sanktionerer og nærmest tvinger bankerne til system,etisk overvågning med deres ekspropriering af borgerens digitale signatur i DanId.

    Det eneste formål med den konstruktion er at sanktionere profitabel magt til et civilt monopol i infrastrukturen mod at det skaber total central magt og kontrol for teknokraterne uden sikkerhed for nogen mod regimets tiltagende magtmisbrug.

  4. Stephan E

    @ Schmendrick

    Artiklen om Kina rummer i øvrigt en interessant pointe. Hvordan regimet udnytter den velstand som markedet skaber til at både finansiere undertrykkelsen og købe alle som kunne være kritiske overfor regimet.

    I Danmark er sidstnævnte nærmest perfektioneret ved at over 60% af den stemmeberettigede befolkning er sat på overførselsindkomster og dermed narres til at tro at det er staten som betaler deres brød for dermed at opretholde regimet.

  5. Stephan E

    For lige at bringe det tilbage til emnet. Løkke skal ikke falde i bestikkelsessystemet fælde ved at privatisere for at effektivisere, men istedet flytte magten indenfor systemet ved at give den enkelte borger kontrol over både penge og egne data.

    Men den primære fjende af velfærd og frihed i et system som det danske ligger i Centraladministrationens egne magtinteresser og den måde den udformes i stadigt mere centraliserende overvågnings- og kontrol modeller via teknologisk fejldesign.

  6. Per Feldvoss Olsen

    Tåbelige værdier, voodo, Egofest … eller co-creation?
    Lars, du har ellers også tidligere rost Verner C. Petersen for hans bog hvor han går i rette med sådanne ‘måle programmer’?

    Der er, mener jeg, en tendens til at vi forsøger at sætte “det gode” op i på en formel – hvorved vi bare kan gøre dette og dermed “være med”. Uden at kende groundswell modellen giver det, du skriver om den, mig mindelser om en værdiliste, enagrammet eller astrologien – modeller hvis styrke ligger i at vi aktiveres til at finde vores egen plads i modellen.. når vi har fundet vores plads er vi også “købt” modellen og vi har fortolket den ind i vores egene ramme. http://www.dr.dk/P1/Samfundstanker/Udsendelser/2009/04/16114723.htm

    En anden interessant udvikling ser vi fra en – for mig – uventet kant, Emilia Van Hauen. Hun har “set lyset” og skrevet en ny bog “Farvel Egofest”, som angiveligt skulle skitsere hvordan vi kommer ud af coaching fælden og ind i det jeg kalder den preproduktive tidsalder (hør Vita her: http://www.dr.dk/CMS/P1/default.drxml?*UR=Vita/Udsendelser/2009/04/30134323.htm&trace=rt4 hør også udsendelserne fra 6 og 17 April!). Fælles for Verner og Emilia er at fokus ligger på formålet – altså “purpose”, som du, Lars, også peger på.

    Til forskel fra den vinkel som Emilia anlægger (den eksistentielle model som du måske kender den fra Maslow/Kierkegaard) ser jeg ikke dette som en nødvendig (Guds? given) udvikling, vi skal altså ikke nødvendigvis gennem eksistentialisme (og “selvudvikling”) – ud over den “forvirring” vi gennemgår i ungdommen.

    Faktisk kan børn “straks” deltage i co-creation fordi elsker at lege ‘sammen’ – konge eksemplet kan ses i skolen (eller hos spejderne) hvor Børnene leger med PC/Wii spil samme, og foretrækker dette frem for at lukke sig inde. Dette er ikke nødvendigvis en eksistentiel udvikling – men en naturlig mulighed som vi bare overser når vi fokusere for kraftig på vores Ego. Man kan altså vælge “selvudviklingen” fra – i nogen grad – og holde fokus på det ‘skabende fællesskab’, men det kræver at man har viljen. Spejder bevægelsen lever i bedste velgående og Grundvig er ikke helt glemt?

    Co-creation betyder altså at vi overskrider os-selv ved at arbejde med værdier på den pragmatiske måde – det ligger i det skabende at vi med omtanke kan skabe nyt frem for at reproducere.
    Vh Per

  7. Peanut

    @ Steffi

    Tja du ved jo alt om editering/censur…

    At du kan benytte Google er mig totalt ligegyldigt, men viser dog at du selv burde være istand til at finde alternative kilder der kunne bidrage til at ændre din noget stereotype politikopfattelse…
    Eller skulle jeg sige recitation af dine yndlingspoeter ( filosofer-økonomer-osv )
    Men hvad den stil kender vi jo fra både AFR og Christopher Arzrouni….LOL
    Eller hvad … gik jeg for tæt på venner der….?

    Betydeligt mere problematisk for dig er dog at du åbenlyst ikke kan læse indenad, eller relatere en tekst til dig selv og dine omgivelser.

    Men hvad det er jo dit problem, ikke mit !

    P.s. Hvornår var du forresten sidst i Kina…?

  8. Stephan E

    Peanut

    Jeg læser mange forskellige kilder – og som sagt fandt jeg din interessant.

    Men du svarer ikke på spørgsmålet. Hvad ville du med referencen? Jeg går ud fra at du har noget på hjertet – ikke mindst siden du gentager den.

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Bloggen er et forum for debat og inspiration. Den er et virtuelt torv, hvor vi kan mødes og blive klogere. For tiden omkring 400 personer hver eneste dag. Lars Kolind skriver et indlæg en eller flere gange om ugen og alle er velkomne til at kommentere. Helst med dit rigtige navn og ikke under pseudonym. Kolind kan ikke svare på alle kommentarer, men meningen er jo også at alle skal inspirere hinanden. Hver blog-post tilhører en eller flere kategorier og vil du læse alle indlæg i en bestemt kategori, trykker du blot på kategoriens navn. Du kan også søge på alle indlæg, hvor et bestemt ord forekommer, f.eks. bureaukrati. Du kan læse og skrive kommentarer ved at klikke på ”kommentarer” under blogposten.

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